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A common finding in empirical studies using micro data on consumer and producer prices is 
that hazard functions for price changes are decreasing. This means that a firm will have a 
lower probability of changing its price the longer it has kept it unchanged. This result is at 
odds with standard models of price setting.    Here a simple explanation is proposed: 
decreasing hazards may result from aggregating heterogeneous price setters. We show 
analytically the form of this heterogeneity effect for the most commonly used pricing rules 
and find that the aggregate hazard is (nearly always) decreasing. Results are illustrated using 
Spanish producer and consumer price data. We find that a very accurate representation of 
individual data is obtained by considering just 4 groups of agents: one group of flexible Calvo 
agents, one group of intermediate Calvo agents and one group of sticky Calvo agents plus an 
annual Calvo process.  
 
JEL classification: C40, D40, E30. 
 
Key words: hazard function, price setting models, heterogeneous agents, mixture models. 
 Non-technical summary
In this paper we show that the common empirical ￿nding that hazard functions for price changes
are decreasing can be reconciled with standard models of price setting behaviour by allowing for the
existence of heterogeneous price setters. This idea is formalised by analysing the consequences for
the aggregate hazard rate of the coexistence of ￿rms with di⁄erent pricing rules. For this purpose,
we ￿rst derive the analytical relationship between the change in the hazard rate of an aggregate
economy and the change in the hazard rate of the groups of agents composing it, without assuming
any speci￿c functional form for the hazard functions of the individual agents. In particular, we
show that the change in the hazard rate of an aggregate is a convex linear combination of the
change in the hazard rates of its components plus a heterogeneity e⁄ect. We then provide the
analytical expressions corresponding to the aggregation of di⁄erent types of agents, each setting
prices according to some of the most widely used models in the literature. First of all, we present
results for the two most widely used time-dependent models in the literature, those of Calvo (1983)
and Taylor (1980), and for a new time-dependent model proposed in this paper to deal with the
existence of ￿rms with annual pricing rules. Overall, we show that if micro data are generated by
heterogeneous ￿rms of these types then the aggregate hazard is (nearly always) decreasing.
We also present results based on the aggregation of agents that follow state dependent pricing
rules as in the model proposed by Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999). We provide two examples
that illustrate the fact that heterogeneity does not necessarily lead to decreasing hazards. In
addition, they show that it is di¢ cult to obtain an aggregate hazard decreasing for all horizons
when some of the agents in the economy face an increasing hazard, since the weighted average of
the individual slopes eventually dominates the (negative) heterogeneity e⁄ect.
In the empirical section, we illustrate our main theoretical result ￿ i.e, that the aggregation of
agents following pricing rules with non-decreasing hazard functions generates an aggregate de-
creasing hazard function- using Spanish producer (PPI) and consumer price (CPI) micro data.
In particular, we show that a mixture model, combining standard price setting rules, is able to
reproduce extremely well the three stylized facts arising from the available international evidence
on unconditional hazard functions:
￿ Hazard functions are downward sloping.
￿ A large fraction of ￿rms change their prices monthly or even more frequently.
￿ An important number of ￿rms review their prices once a year and change them every 12,
24, 36 ... months
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Calvo agents with di⁄erent average price durations. Speci￿cally, we estimate, using the EM
algorithm, a ￿nite mixture of Calvo models considering 1 to 5 potential groups and then choose
the optimal model according to standard model selection criteria. We ￿nd that a very accurate
representation of individual data is obtained by considering just 4 groups of agents: one group of
￿ exible Calvo agents -with average price duration slightly over 1 month-, one group of intermediate
Calvo agents -with average price duration around 10 months- and one group of sticky Calvo agents
-with average price duration over 3 years- plus an annual Calvo process -with average price duration
around a year and a half-.
In terms of the relative size of the groups, the largest is the intermediate Calvo group, accounting
for around 50% of the production value in the case of the PPI and 57% of consumer￿ s expenditure
in the case of the CPI. The ￿ exible and sticky Calvo groups are roughly similar in size in terms
of the share of PPI (slightly above 20%). In the case of CPI, the share of ￿ exible Calvo agents
(13%) is lower than the share of the sticky Calvo group (18%). Finally, the annual Calvo group
is the smallest one, accounting for 7% of PPI and 12% of CPI. An analysis of the composition
of the groups in terms of the di⁄erent types of goods and services provides interesting results.
Speci￿cally, we observe that the ￿ exible pricing rule is used mostly by producers of energy and
intermediate goods and by retailers of food products; the intermediate rule is common among
all producers and retailers, although to a lesser extent among energy producers and retailers of
unprocessed food; and the sticky and annual Calvo pricing rules are mainly used by producers of
capital and consumer durable goods and by retailers of non-energy goods and services.
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A common ￿nding in empirical studies using micro data on consumer and producer prices is that
hazard functions for price changes are decreasing1 (see ￿gure 1). This means that a ￿rm will have
a lower probability of changing its price the longer it has kept it unchanged. This result is at odds
with standard theoretical models of price setting.
The explanation to this puzzle proposed in this paper is that unconditional decreasing hazards are
due to the aggregation of heterogeneous price setters, and thus decreasing hazards are not neces-
sarily evidence against standard models (e.g. Taylor, Calvo or truncated Calvo). The intuition is
as follows. By de￿nition, the probability of observing price changes is lower for ￿rms with sticky
price schemes than for ￿rms following ￿ exible pricing rules, while the aggregate hazard considers
price changes for all ￿rms. Therefore, when the aggregate hazard function is obtained, the share
of price changes corresponding to ￿rms with more ￿ exible pricing rules decreases as the horizon
increases and, consequently, the hazard rate also decreases2.
In this paper we formalise this idea by analysing the consequences for the aggregate hazard rate
of the coexistence of ￿rms with di⁄erent pricing rules. In particular, we show that if micro data
are generated by heterogeneous ￿rms then the aggregate hazard is (nearly always) decreasing.
We provide analytical expressions for these heterogeneity e⁄ects in the most widely used pricing
models.
Moreover, in the empirical section, we test some of these theoretical results using Spanish consumer
(CPI) and producer price (PPI) micro data. We take a parsimonious approach, assuming that
the aggregate economy is composed of Calvo agents with di⁄erent average price duration3, and
let the data determine the optimal number of groups. In particular, we estimate a ￿nite mixture
of Calvo models considering 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 groups and then choose the optimal model according
to several model selection criteria.
1A more detailed description of the empirical evidence on consumer prices (CPI) can be found in Baumgartner
et al (2004) for Austria, Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004) for Belgium, FougŁre et al (2004) for France, Veronese et
al (2004) for Italy, Alvarez and Hernando (2004) for Spain, Campbell and Eden (2004) and Klenow and Krystov
(2004) for the United States. In addition, Dhyne et al (2004) review the empirical evidence for CPI across euro
area countries. Finally, empirical evidence on producer prices is found in Alvarez et al (2004) for Spain and in
Stahl (2004) for Germany.
2Conditional estimations of the hazard function of price spells by Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004), Dias, Robalo
Marques and Santos Silva (2004) and FougŁre, Le Bihan and Sevestre (2004) indicate that accounting for product
heterogeneity of products indeed reduces the negative slope of the hazard function. These results are consistent
with the hypothesis that the declining overall hazard is mainly a result of aggregation.
3The Calvo (1983) model of time dependent price setting involves a simple analytical expression for the hazard
function (as well as the density and survival), which requires estimating only one parameter per group. An
alternative would be Taylor￿ s (1980) model. However, in this context, this model is less parsimonious since it
requires having as many groups as exit times or actual spell durations observed in the data.
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March 2005We ￿nd the most adequate description of both the CPI and PPI data is a model with 4 Calvo
groups of agents: one group with a very ￿ exible pricing rule that results in an average duration
slightly over 1 month; another group with intermediate ￿ exibility (average price-duration is around
10 months); and, a group with very sticky prices, which are kept constant on average for more
than 3 years; plus a group of ￿rms with an annual Calvo pricing rule, with an average price
duration of around a year and a half. In terms of the relative size of the groups, the largest is
the intermediate group, accounting for around 50% of the production value in the case of the PPI
and 57% of consumer￿ s expenditure in the case of the CPI. The ￿ exible and sticky Calvo groups
are roughly similar in size in terms of the share of PPI (slightly above 20%). In the case of CPI,
the share of ￿ exible Calvo agents (13%) is lower than the share of the sticky Calvo group (18%).
Finally, the annual Calvo group is the smallest one, accounting for 7% of PPI and 12% of CPI.
An analysis of the composition of the groups in terms of the di⁄erent types of goods and services
provides interesting results. Speci￿cally, we observe that the ￿ exible pricing rule is used mostly
by producers of energy and intermediate goods and by retailers of food products; the intermediate
rule is used by all producers and retailers, except energy producers and retailers of unprocessed
food; and the sticky and annual Calvo pricing rules are mainly used by producers of capital and
consumer durable goods and by retailers of non-energy goods and services.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical expression of the hazard
for the aggregate economy. Section 3 shows these results for the Calvo, Taylor and Dotsey, King
and Wolman￿ s price-setting mechanisms. Section 4 presents the results of an empirical application
for Spanish producer and consumer price data as well as the econometric methodology used.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 General case
The aim of this section is to present the relationship between the (change in the) hazard rate of
an aggregate economy and the (change in the) hazard rate of the groups of agents composing it.
We use throughout a discrete time approach since this is the one most frequently used for price
setting models.
First of all, it is assumed that the aggregate economy is composed of two groups of agents with
di⁄erent hazard functions, with sizes s1 and s2, respectively.
The hazard rate is the probability that a price will change in period k, provided that it has
remained constant during the previous k ￿1 periods4. More formally, the hazard rate for group i
4k is the elapsed time since start of the price spell.
9
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where fi(k) is the density function, which measures the frequency of ￿rms adjusting prices in
period k and Si(k) is the survival function, which measures the frequency of ￿rms which have
kept their prices constant during the previous k ￿ 1 periods.
For the aggregate economy, the aggregate frequency of ￿rms changing prices in period k and the
aggregate frequency of ￿rms not having adjusted prices in the previous k ￿1 periods are given by
f(k) = ￿f
1(k) + (1 ￿ ￿)f
2(k)
S(k) = ￿S




s1+s2 is the share of ￿rms of group 1 in the economy as a whole. That is, the density
function and the survival function of the aggregate economy are convex linear combination of the
respective functions for each of the groups of ￿rms, with ￿xed weights equal to the relative size of
each group.
In turn, the hazard rate of the aggregate economy in period k can be expressed as
h(k) = ￿(k)h
1(k) + [1 ￿ ￿(k)]h
2(k)





is a function of k and thus not constant along the hazard.
Therefore, the aggregate hazard is a convex linear combination of individual hazards, although
the weights vary with k.
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This expression shows that the change in the hazard rate of an aggregate is a convex linear
combination of the change in the hazard rates of its components plus a heterogeneity e⁄ect6.
This heterogeneity e⁄ect is the discrete time version of the well known result in the duration
analysis literature that not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity biases estimated hazard func-
tions towards negative duration dependence (see Lancaster and Nickell(1980) or Heckman and
Singer(1986)). In fact, "(k) converges to 1 as ￿k tends to zero and the expression of H(k) con-
verges to the continuous time one (see Appendix A). Notice, however, that in the discrete time
case the heterogeneity e⁄ect will be positive if "(k) < 0. This contrasts with the continuous time
result, where the heterogeneity e⁄ect cannot be positive.
Note that, for the three most widely used time dependent pricing rules (Calvo, truncated Calvo7
and Taylor) the change in individual hazards is zero for all k, so that the slope is completely
determined by the heterogeneity e⁄ect. For these models, this e⁄ect is never positive and so is
the slope of the hazard8.
A necessary and su¢ cient condition to have a downward sloping hazard is that the third term in









[1 ￿ ￿(k)] ￿ ￿H(k) (2)


























6Note that the heterogeneity e⁄ect disappears if the hazards of the two groups are equal (h1(k) = h2(k)) or if,
for a given k, there are no more ￿rms belonging to one group (￿(k) = 0 or ￿(k) = 1).
7See Wolman (1999) and Dotsey (2002).
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In this section we provide the expressions corresponding to the aggregation of di⁄erent types of
agents, each setting prices according to some of the most widely used models in the literature. First
of all, we present results for the two most widely used time-dependent models in the literature,
those of Calvo (1983) and Taylor (1980). Then, we propose a new time-dependent model to deal
with the existence of ￿rms with annual pricing rules. Finally, we present results based on the state
dependent model of Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999)9.
3.1 Calvo agents
The model of price setting introduced by the seminal work of Calvo (1983) has become one of the
most widely used in the current macro literature on sticky prices, mainly due to its theoretical
tractability and that is easy to test empirically10. This model of price setting assumes that there is
a constant probability that a given price setter will change its price at any instant. This, together
with the assumption that there are a large number of price setters who act independently, implies
that there is a constant proportion of prices being changed at any instant.
The density, survival and hazard functions for this type of agents take the following functional
forms
f








i(k) = (1 ￿ ￿i)
When we aggregate two groups of agents with Calvo price setting rules with di⁄erent average price
durations, the aggregate economy will have the following density, survival and hazard functions,
respectively
f(k) = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿
k￿1
1 ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿
k￿1
2 (1 ￿ ￿)
9In addition, in Appendix B we show results for the so-called Truncated Calvo model.
10Important contributions to this literature include Roberts (1995), Fuhrer and Moore (1995), King and Wolman
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March 2005Figure 2. Hazard of 2 groups with Calvo price setting and average price duration of 3 and 12 months,
respectively











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
duration months 3
duration in months 12
Population Hazard rate,
50% of firms with Calvo average duration of 12 months









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
S(k) = ￿
k￿1
1 ￿ + ￿
k￿1
2 (1 ￿ ￿)











An interesting property of this model is that the aggregate hazard converges asymptotically to
the hazard of the group with the longest average price duration11, as can be seen in the right hand







where ￿ = maxf￿ig (4)
In this case, the change in the aggregate hazard as k changes is equal to
￿h(k)
￿k





That is, when the aggregate economy is composed of groups of Calvo agents, there is only a
heterogeneity e⁄ect because the hazard is constant for all k and 0 ￿ ￿(k) ￿ 1. Therefore, the





i(k) = 1 & lim
k!1
￿
j(k) = 0 if ￿i > ￿j
13
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 461
March 2005hazard as k changes converges asymptotically to zero, since the aggregate hazard converges to the
hazard of the group with the longest average duration (see equation (4)). As an illustration, ￿gure
2 presents in the left hand side the hazard functions of two groups of Calvo agents with durations
of 3 and 12 months and in the right hand side the downward sloping hazard of the aggregate.
Results are easily generalized for the case of N groups of ￿rms following di⁄erent Calvo price
setting rules. The change in the aggregate hazard as k changes is equal to
￿h(k)
￿k














and it is clear that the change in the aggregate hazard is only due to the heterogeneity e⁄ect
and that the aggregate hazard will never be positive. Again, the aggregate hazard will converge
asymptotically to the one of the group with longest average price duration.
3.2 Taylor agents
The model of price setting ￿rst introduced by the seminal work of Taylor (1980) is another model
widely used in the current macro literature on sticky prices12. This model of price setting assumes
that prices are set by multiperiod contracts, thus remaining constant for the duration of the
contract.
When one aggregates two groups of agents with Taylor contracts of di⁄erent duration, J1 > J2,





1 ￿ ￿ for k = J2
1 for k = J1
0 for other k
In this case the hazard rate is zero except in those periods in which the end of the Taylor contract
occurs for one of the groups, that is, it is never decreasing. The same is true when the economy
is composed of several groups of ￿rms with di⁄erent Taylor contracts.
Alternatively, when the aggregate economy is composed of two groups of ￿rms, one setting prices
according to a Calvo model and another setting prices according to a Taylor contract of length J,
12Important contributions to this literature include Erceg et al (2000), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) and
Coenen and Levin (2004).
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￿(k)(1 ￿ ￿) for k = 0;1;:::;J ￿ 1
￿(k)(1 ￿ ￿) + [1 ￿ ￿(k)] for k = J
(1 ￿ ￿) for k > J
where ￿(k) =
s1￿k￿1
s1￿k￿1+s2. As shown in ￿gure 3, this aggregate hazard will be decreasing for all k
until the period in which Taylor contracts end. Note that hazard rates for horizons shorter than
the length of the Taylor contract are lower than those for longer horizons.
3.3 Annual pricing agents
International evidence shows that aggregate hazard functions of price spells are characterised by
local modes at durations of 12, 24, 36,... months (see ￿gure 1), indicating that a fraction of ￿rms
apply annual pricing rules. This is in line with results of `lvarez and Hernando (2005) for Spain
and Fabiani et al (2004) using the surveys on pricing behaviour that have been recently carried out
for most euro area countries. A signi￿cant fraction of ￿rms review their prices on a yearly basis
and decide to change them on the basis of cost and demand developments. Speci￿cally, modal
and median number of price changes per year is one in eight out of the nine countries considered.
This stylized fact is easily accommodated theoretically by de￿ning a group of agents with an
annual Calvo rule, according to which these ￿rms reset their prices every 12 months, but keep
them constant in between. We propose a novel pricing rule to try to capture this behaviour.
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Speci￿cally, the frequency and survival functions for agents using this pricing rule are as follows
f(k) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿
int(
k￿1
















which generate the following hazard function
h(k) = (1 ￿ ￿)I12
Note that one year Taylor contracts are a special case of this pricing scheme with probability of
price change equal to one.
When the aggregate economy is composed of two groups of agents, one setting prices according to
a standard Calvo mechanism with parameter ￿ and another setting prices according to an annual
Calvo with parameter ￿s, with sizes s1 and s2, respectively, the aggregate hazard function takes
the following form







. As shown in ￿gure 4, the slope of this aggregate hazard is decreas-
ing for all months except for the multiples of 12, when the agents with annual Calvo rules change
their prices. Comparing values of the hazard function for periods multiples of 12 also shows a
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decreasing pattern.Figure 5. Hazard of 1 Calvo and 1 DKW model
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3.4 Dotsey, King and Wolman agents
In the models of price setting analyzed so far, ￿rm￿ s pricing decisions are time-dependent, that is,
they do not depend on any of the state variables determining the situation of the ￿rm. In contrast
to these models, Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) (DKW henceforth) present a theoretical state-
dependent pricing framework13, in which every ￿rm faces each period a di⁄erent ￿xed cost of
adjusting its nominal price, which is drawn independently over time. At the start of each period
there is a discrete distribution of ￿rms which last adjusted its price k periods ago. The number
of ￿rm types is determined endogenously and will vary with factors such as the average in￿ ation
rate or the elasticity of product demand. When in￿ ation is high, ￿rms choose to maintain a given
price for fewer periods, because in￿ ation erodes its relative price. Positive in￿ ation means that the
bene￿ts of adjusting prices are higher for ￿rms whose prices were set further in the past (which
then su⁄er higher accumulated in￿ ation), and this translates into higher adjustment probabilities
for such ￿rms. As a consequence, the hazard rate is increasing.
This model is very interesting and intuitive but also analytically complex and di¢ cult to test
empirically. In fact, it is not possible to derive closed form expressions for the hazard function (or
the density and survival functions). Nevertheless, numerical expressions of the hazard rate can be
obtained through simulations for a given underlying distribution of menu costs of adjusting prices
and for given steady state values of the other variables of the model.
In order to show the implications of having some agents in an economy behaving in a DKW
13Another example of state-dependent pricing rules is Golosov and Lucas (2003).
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state dependent manner, we present two types of simulations. The ￿rst one corresponds to the
aggregation of one group of Calvo agents -with constant hazard rate- and another one of DKW
agents -with increasing hazard rate- (see left hand side of ￿gure 5). As was shown in equation (1),
the slope of the aggregate hazard of this economy will have two components: the weighted average
of the hazard rates of each group plus a heterogeneity e⁄ect. As can be seen in the right hand
side of ￿gure 5, the aggregate hazard declines initially since the (negative) heterogeneity e⁄ect
dominates the upward sloping hazard of DKW agents. However, for longer horizons the upward
sloping hazard e⁄ect dominates.
The second simulation aggregates two groups of DKW agents with di⁄erent steady state in￿ ation
rates. As can be seen in the left hand side of ￿gure 6, the higher the in￿ ation rate the shorter the
length of time prices remains unchanged. In this case, the heterogeneity e⁄ect is very moderate
and the aggregate hazard is again (nearly always) increasing.
These two examples illustrate the fact that heterogeneity does not necessarily lead to decreasing
hazards. In addition, they show that it is di¢ cult to obtain an aggregate hazard decreasing for all
horizons when some of the agents in the economy face an increasing hazard, since the weighted
average of the individual slopes eventually dominates the (negative) heterogeneity e⁄ect.
4 Empirical results
In this section, we review the international evidence on unconditional hazard functions for price
changes and test empirically the theoretical results derived in the previous sections.
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the introduction) employing consumer price and producer price micro data suggests the following
three stylised facts:
F1: Hazard functions are downward sloping.
F2: A large fraction of ￿rms change their prices monthly or even more frequently.
F3: An important number of ￿rms review their prices once a year and change them every 12, 24,
36 ... months.
As explained in the theoretical sections above, it is possible to build price setting models that allow
for these stylized facts. For this purpose, we take the most parsimonious approach possible and
consider only time dependent representations of Calvo price setting processes. The main reason
for using the Calvo model is that it is analytically simple, easier to estimate14, and, at the same
time, easily reconciled with the stylized facts (see section 3.1). Alternatively, the Taylor model
of price setting could be used. However, this model is less parsimonious in this context, since it
requires having as many groups of agents as exit times or actual spell durations observed in the
data.
A model based on Calvo price setting consistent with the stylized facts would be as follows:
- F1 can be explained as the result of the aggregation of several heterogeneous agents. In fact,
a simple way to incorporate this stylised fact into the analysis is to specify two (or more) agents
with di⁄erent Calvo price setting rules (see ￿gure 2 for an example).
- F2 can be easily accommodated assuming that there is a fraction of ￿rms with highly ￿ exible
Calvo pricing rules or, alternatively, one-month Taylor contracts.
- Finally, F3 suggests using an annual Calvo pricing rule like the one de￿ned in section 3.3.

































14One should always keep in mind that the hazard function is highly non-linear.
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represents the annual Calvo agents, ￿j, represent the Calvo parameters and ￿j the weights of the
di⁄erent groups of agents.
In this section we have considered only time dependent representations of price setting processes.
Although this framework may provide a reasonable description of the data at an aggregate level,
particularly in a stable economic environment, evidence presented in `lvarez and Hernando (2004)
and `lvarez, Burriel and Hernando (2004) points to the importance of state dependent elements
such as in￿ ation and ￿scal developments when analysing pricing behaviour of individual ￿rms
in Spain15. However, the estimated impacts of these state dependent variables are moderate.
Similarly, Klenow and Krystov (2004) show that a calibration of the DKW model for the U.S.
provides impulse responses that are quite close to those of a simple time dependent model. It
has to be stressed that closed form expressions for the hazard function of the DKW model do not
exist, which renders its empirical implementation di¢ cult16. Moreover, empirical hazard rates do
not show an upward slope, as suggested by DKW model17.
The most adequate econometric methodology to estimate a model like the one described by equa-
tion (5) is a ￿nite mixture model. This will be described in the next section.
4.1 Econometric speci￿cation: Finite mixture models
This section brie￿ y reviews the ￿nite mixture models that are employed in the section below. Finite
mixture models have been applied to a wide variety of data in the physical, social and medical
sciences18 since the seminal contribution of Pearson (1894). A ￿nite mixture model represents
a heterogeneous population consisting of g groups of sizes proportional to ￿j (j = 1;:::;g) and
where the group from which each observation is drawn is unknown. The probability density
function of the observed random variable y has the form
f(y;￿;￿) = ￿1f1(y;￿1) + ￿2f2(y;￿2) + ::: + ￿gfg(y;￿g)
This is a weighted average of densities f1, ..., fg with mixing weights ￿1, ..., ￿g where ￿1+￿2+...+￿g=
1 and ￿j is a vector of the unknown parameters in fj, which need not belong to the same parametric
family.
15In future work we intend to estimate state dependent models that also use the economic theory based unobserved
heterogeneity that is described in this section.
16In future work we plan to consider state dependent pricing models by estimating mixture modes with covariates.
17To try to capture an upward sloping component we have considered the discrete Weibull distribution as proposed
by Nakagawa and Osaki (1975). Available estimates do not lead to a group of agents with an upward sloping hazard.
18See Titterington et al (1992) and Mclahlan and Peel (2000) for a review.
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account that duration data are typically censored19. Speci￿cally, allowing for censoring, the log



















where NC and C refer to non censored and censored price spells and fj and Sj represent the
density and survival functions, respectively. Since this log-likelihood function involves the log of
a sum of terms that are highly non-linear functions of parameters and data, its maximization
using standard optimization routines is not in general feasible. Therefore, we resort to the EM
algorithm, as it is usual in the literature(see Dempster, Laird and Rubin, 1977)20. Speci￿cally,
we consider the data augmented with unobservable dummy variables that identify each group ￿ij
= (￿i1, . . . , ￿ig), such that, for each i, ￿ij = 1, for one j and ￿ij = 0 for the rest). The log

















and the EM approach computes ML estimates using the following algorithm.
1. Expectation (E) step. For given ￿, compute ￿ij (the estimated conditional probability of












j=1￿jSj(yi;￿j)if yi is censored






2. Maximization (M) step. For given values of ￿ij and ￿j, maximize the log likelihood function
with respect to ￿
Starting from initial estimates, the EM algorithm consists in iterating 1) and 2) until convergence.
It can be shown that each iteration of the algorithm increases the likelihood and that it ￿nally
19In what follows we do not take into account left censored observations. For ease of exposition we will refer to
right censored observations simply as censored observations.
20Alternatively, Diebolt and Robert (1994) and Richardson and Green (1997) use Bayesian approaches to estimate
￿nite mixtures employing Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods.
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model employing grouped data21.
Our empirical strategy is agnostic with respect to the number of groups characterizing the data,
that is, about the number of j0s in equation (5). The optimal number of di⁄erent groups of Calvo
agents is obtained by estimating the mixture model, separately for models including one to ￿ve
groups of di⁄erent Calvo agents (values of j = 1￿5) and also augmented models incorporating a
group of annual Calvo agents. Then, for each of these estimations we compute two model selection
criteria: the Akaike Information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).











where d is the number of unknown coe¢ cients estimated, n is the number of observations and
L(b ￿) is the maximum likelihood for the set of unknown parameters estimated.
So far we have implicitly assumed that the researcher is interested in obtaining the mixture
distribution of price spells. Nonetheless, other interests are likely to arise. First, one can also
be interested in determining the number of ￿rms22 belonging to each particular group. In this
case, the distribution of price spells cannot be directly used since, by de￿nition, ￿rms whose
prices remain unchanged for long time periods contribute less price spells and are, therefore,
underrepresented in terms of price spells. In the empirical section below, we estimate proportions
of ￿rms by randomly selecting one price spell for each price product trajectory and then applying
the EM algorithm. Second, the use of the number of ￿rms may also be considered misleading,
since the value of production greatly varies across branches of activity. Therefore, when using
the number of ￿rms one is overrepresenting ￿rms with low production value. In applied work,
production (or expenditure) weighted shares are likely to be the main object of interest.
As stated above, the presented framework considers that each price spell is the result of one simple
21The minimum distance estimates can be obtained in the following manner. If h = [h(1);:::;h(k)] denotes the
empirical hazard and h(￿;￿) = [h(1;￿;￿);:::;h(k;￿;￿)) the hazard corresponding to a given theoretical model, then










where ￿￿1 is a weighting matrix.
22Firms and retailers generally manufacture (sell) di⁄erent products. However, for ease of exposition, we refer
to ￿rms (retailers) instead of manufacturing (selling) units of a speci￿c good or service.
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models
AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
1 144469 144476 1203134 1203144 130709 130711 1153457 1153460
2 133104 133116 914830 914847 123544 123552 906843 906853
3 121257 121274 897292 897316 122468 122480 902244 902261
4 125501 125523 902373 902404 124889 124906 920091 920115




standard + 1 annual Calvo
Table 1. Producer Prices: selection of the number of different
Calvo agents
firms spells
price setting rule. We do not, however, directly observe to which group the observation precisely
belongs, although a model-based clustering procedure may be designed to classify the di⁄erent
price spells into groups with di⁄erent price setting behaviour. Speci￿cally, for each individual, we
compute the conditional probability of belonging to a given price setting group. This probability,
along with a classi￿cation rule23, allows us to assign ￿rms or price spells to di⁄erent pricing
rules. The analysis of these clusters can be very informative. For example, we can determine the
relationship of these price setting groups with some other variables such as the type of good, which
allows us to compute the (value-added or expenditure) weighted shares of the di⁄erent types of
agents. Moreover, as will be exploited in future work, duration models for the di⁄erent economic
theory based clusters may be built.
4.2 Results for producer price data
In this section we try to account for the three abovementioned stylised facts in explaining the
empirical hazard for Spanish producer price data. The dataset on which we compute the hazard
function contains over 1.6 million price records for a 7 year period (1991:11-1999:2) and covers
over 99% of the production value of the PPI. This dataset is also employed in `lvarez, Burriel
and Hernando (2004), where a detailed explanation can be found.
23One possibility is to assign each observation to the group for which the maximum conditional probability
is obtained. This is known in the literature as maximum a posteriori (MAP) rule and is the most widely used
procedure in the non-Bayesian literature.
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Flexible Calvo 16.5% 0.11 1.1 56.9% 0.11 1.1 15.4% 0.08 1.1 56.7% 0.11 1.1
(0,38%) (0,01) (0,02) (0,14%) (0,00) (0,00) (0,37%) (0,01) (0,01) (0,14%) (0,00) (0,00)
Intermediate Calvo 48.2% 0.92 12.3 32.3% 0.89 9.2 60.8% 0.93 13.8 37.8% 0.90 10.5
(1,60%) (0,00) (0,48) (0,28%) (0,00) (0,11) (1,77%) (0,00) (0,47) (0,31%) (0,00) (0,11)
9.2 6.9
Sticky Calvo 26.9% 0.99 91.4 6.8% 0.98 50.1 23.8% 0.99 105.9 5.5% 0.98 56.0
(1,68%) (0,00) (8,86) (0,29%) (0,00) (2,12) (1,87%) (0,00) (13,82) (0,33%) (0,00) (3,28)
Annual Calvo 8.5% 0.28 16.8 4.0% 0.21 15.2
(0,27%) (0,02) (0,03) (0,06%) (0,01) (0,01)
Log likelihood -60621 -448639 -61229 -451117
Number of observations 26965 244864 26965 244864
Joint significance Wald test 20.15 2479.23 68.98 2553.07
p- value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 2. Producer Prices: estimation of price setting models
standard + 1 annual Calvo standard  Calvo
spells firms firms spells
To obtain the optimal number of di⁄erent groups of Calvo agents in the producer price data, we
compute the values for the two model selection criteria explained in the methodological section.
As table 1 shows, according to both AIC and BIC, it is optimal to estimate a model composed of
3 types of standard Calvo agents, plus 1 group of annual Calvo agents.
The results of estimating our benchmark speci￿cation, which includes three di⁄erent groups of
Calvo agents plus one group of annual Calvo ￿rms, can be seen in the ￿rst and second columns
of table 2. In addition, in the third and fourth columns of this table we present results for a basic
speci￿cation in which there are no annual Calvo agents. In the case of both speci￿cations, we
report the results of estimating two di⁄erent samples: one with all the price spells included in the
PPI sample (we refer to this as "spells￿sample") and another including only one spell (randomly
selected) per ￿rm in the sample (we refer to this as "￿rms￿sample"). As indicated in section 4.1,
using the ￿rms￿sample corrects the over-representation of price spells with short durations. In all
cases, all parameters are individually and jointly signi￿cant. Moreover, as Figure 7 shows, these
parsimonious models ￿t the overall hazard function extremely well.
The results in table 2 indicate that the Calvo parameters (and the implied durations) are fairly
similar across samples and speci￿cations. In all cases we ￿nd that the three types of standard
Calvo models can be characterized as follows: one group of ￿ exible price setters with average
price durations of 1.1 months, one group of intermediate price setters with average price durations
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Contributions to the PPI hazard rate by firm
flexible Calvo intermediate Calvo
sticky Calvo annual Calvo
between 9 and 14 months and one group of sticky price setters with average price durations over
3 years24. In addition, the group of annual Calvo price setters has average price durations close to
the intermediate standard Calvo group, between 15 and 17 months. As expected, the estimated
weights of each group vary greatly across the two samples. In the case of the ￿rms￿sample the
largest group is the intermediate Calvo group (48-60%), followed by the sticky Calvo (24-27%)
and the ￿ exible Calvo (15-16%) groups. On the other hand, in the case of the sample with all
spells the largest group is the ￿ exible Calvo (57%), followed by the intermediate Calvo (32-37%)
and the sticky Calvo (6-7%). This result is not surprising given that shorter spells tend to be
highly over-represented in the spells sample since they occur more often. In both samples, the
annual Calvo price setters are the smallest group (4-9%).
The results just mentioned are based on the share of spells or ￿rms in the sample. However, it
might be more informative to know the share of the value of production in the aggregate economy
of each group. Using a maximum a posteriori (MAP) rule, we have assigned each ￿rm to a speci￿c
24Alternatively, since the duration distribution is asymmetric, it is also interesting to look at the median duration
of prices. We ￿nd shorter median durations for all the groups: the intermediate Calvo agents (6.1-9.2 months),
sticky Calvo group (34.4-73.1 months), ￿ exible Calvo group (0.3 months) and annual Calvo group (12 months).
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durables intermediate energy capital All groups
Price setting Model
Flexible Calvo 3.5% 1.3% 1.0% 8.8% 6.1% 1.3% 21.9%
Intermediate Calvo 8.6% 7.0% 7.2% 17.6% 4.2% 5.9% 50.5%
Sticky Calvo 3.0% 3.1% 3.7% 7.2% 0.4% 3.5% 20.9%
Annual Calvo 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 2.0% 0.3% 1.2% 6.8%
Share of PPI 16.1% 12.4% 13.1% 35.5% 11.1% 11.8% 100.0%
Table 3. Price setting models by PPI main industrial groupings (using PPI weights)
type of pricing rule. Then table 3 reports, for the ￿rm sample, the distribution of ￿rms weighted
according to the PPI weights across the main PPI components and the di⁄erent pricing rules.
The most important group in terms of the share of the value of production in the aggregate
economy is that of intermediate Calvo agents. This group represents around 50% of the production
value in the economy and is characterised by mean and median durations of 12.3 and 8.7 months25.
All di⁄erent types of goods are represented in this group, although the share of energy products
is particularly low. The second most important group corresponds to ￿ exible Calvo agents, which
represent 22% of the PPI and have an average duration slightly above 1 month. The contribution of
energy goods and, to a lesser extent, other intermediate goods is particularly relevant, whereas the
share of capital, durables and non-durables non-food goods is quite moderate. In turn, the share
of sticky Calvo agents is only slightly below that of ￿ exible ones, although estimated durations are
very high. Producers of capital and consumer durable goods tend to use this pricing rule, which
is hardly used in energy branches. Finally, the share of agents using annual pricing is only 7%
and the corresponding duration is slightly less than one year and a half. This type of behaviour
is particularly frequent for producers of capital and consumption durables goods.
These production weighted shares may be compared with the ￿rm and spell shares shown in table
2. As expected, the share in terms of price spells of ￿ exible Calvo agents is much higher than in
terms of ￿rms (weighted or not using production weights). The shares in terms of price spells of
sticky Calvo agents is much lower than in terms of ￿rms, which in turn, over-represent the share
of ￿rms weighted in terms of production value.
The bottom part of ￿gure 7 presents the contributions of the di⁄erent types of agents to the
hazard of the benchmark model. As can be seen, the downward slope of the hazard is, to a large
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models
AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
1 75704 75711 894119 894129 73253 73255 891611 891614
2 76654 76664 787640 787656 68925 68931 789456 789465
3 67275 67290 778891 778914 68132 68142 781875 781891
4 67810 67829 781125 781154 68177 68192 786004 786026
5 67825 67848 779982 780017 68203 68222 791049 791078
firms




standard + 1 annual Calvo standard Calvo
firms spells
extent, explained by the aggregation of these Calvo agents: the weight of intermediate-Calvo price
setters relative to sticky-Calvo price setters is decreasing, being negligible for large horizons. The
existence of highly ￿ exible Calvo price setters is accounted for by the very-￿ exible Calvo contracts.
Finally, the models that consider annual Calvo agents show that their share is modest, although
very important in explaining the spikes at 12, 24, 36,... months.
4.3 Results for consumer price data
This section examines the relevance of the three stylised facts in explaining the empirical hazard
for Spanish consumer price data. The dataset on which we compute the hazard function contains
over 1.1 million price records for a 9 year period (1993-2001) and covers around 70% of the
expenditure of the CPI basket. Energy products are not covered in this database. This dataset is
also employed in `lvarez and Hernando (2004), where a detailed analysis can be found.
Like in the producer price case, we start by ￿nding out the optimal number of di⁄erent groups of
Calvo agents found in the data. Table 4 shows that, according to the two model selection criteria
used, it is optimal to estimate a model composed of 3 types of standard Calvo agents, plus 1 group
of annual Calvo agents. This is similar to the PPI case.
The results of estimating the ￿nite mixture model for our benchmark speci￿cation, which includes
three di⁄erent groups of Calvo agents plus one group of annual Calvo ￿rms, can be seen in the
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Flexible Calvo 22.1% 0.20 1.3 47.5% 0.24 1.3 21.6% 0.19 1.2 48.3% 0.24 1.3
(0,62%) (0,02) (0,03) (0,28%) (0,00) (0,01) (0,68%) (0,02) (0,03) (0,26%) (0,00) (0,00)
Intermediate Calvo 50.4% 0.90 10.3 39.5% 0.84 6.4 59.9% 0.92 11.8 41.9% 0.86 7.3
(1,44%) (0,00) (0,41) (0,31%) (0,00) (0,08) (1,64%) (0,00) (0,43) (0,35%) (0,00) (0,09)
Sticky Calvo 20.1% 0.98 58.4 9.8% 0.96 27.9 18.5% 0.98 62.6 9.7% 0.96 28.2
(1,52%) (0,00) (4,12) (0,30%) (0,00) (0,56) (1,75%) (0,00) (5,45) (0,37%) (0,00) (0,64)
Annual Calvo 7.4% 0.42 20.5 3.2% 0.30 17.2
(0,34%) (0,02) (0,06) (0,06%) (0,01) (0,02)
Log likelihood -33630 -389439 -34061 -390932
Number of observations 12494 179673 12494 179673
Joint significance Wald test 65.75 2058.42 86.84 2792.25
p- value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 5. Consumer Prices: estimation of price setting models
standard + 1 annual Calvo standard  Calvo
spells firms firms spells
￿rst and second columns of table 5. In addition, in the third and fourth columns of this table
we present results for a basic speci￿cation in which annual Calvo agents are not considered. In
all cases, all parameters are individually and jointly signi￿cant. Moreover, as Figure 8 shows,
these parsimonious models ￿t the overall hazard function extremely well26. The results are very
similar to the PPI case and also very similar across samples and speci￿cations. The three types
of standard Calvo models can be characterized as follows: one group of ￿ exible price setters with
average price durations of 1.2-1.3 months , one group of intermediate price setters with average
price durations between 6 and 12 months and one group of sticky price setters with average price
durations between 27 and 63 months. In addition, the group of annual calvo price setters have
average price durations of around a year and a half27. That is, we ￿nd on average that CPI prices
have shorter mean durations than PPI prices for the intermediate and sticky groups of Calvo
agents, but slightly longer for the ￿ exible and annual Calvo agents.
The estimated weights of each group have a slightly di⁄erent ordering in the ￿rms sample than for
the PPI case: the largest group is the intermediate Calvo group (50-60%), followed by the ￿ exible
Calvo (22%) and the sticky Calvo (19-20%). The ordering is the same for the spells sample: the
largest group is the ￿ exible Calvo (48%), followed by the intermediate Calvo (40-42%) and the
26Note the quarterly spikes of the estimated hazard function. These are explained by the fact that some prices
are collected on a quarterly basis.
27Alternatively, since the duration distribution is asymmetric, it is also interesting to look at the median duration
of prices. We ￿nd shorter median durations for the di⁄erent agents: intermediate Calvo agents (4.1-7.8 months),
sticky Calvo groups (19.0-43.0 months), ￿ exible Calvo group (0.4-0.5 months) and annual Calvo group (12 months).
28
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 461












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748
3 Calvo & 1 annual Calvo
Contributions to the PPI hazard rate by firm
flexible Calvo intermediate Calvo










0 12 24 36 48
months since last price change
fitted  hazard empirical  hazard
















0 12 24 36 48
months  since  last  price  change
fitted  hazard empirical  hazard
3  Calvo  &  Calvo  annual










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748
3 Calvo & 1 annual Calvo
Contributions to the CPI hazard rate
flexible Calvo intermediate  Calvo















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748
3 Calvo & 1 annual Calvo
Contributions to the CPI hazard rate by firm
flexible Calvo intermediate  Calvo
sticky Calvo annual Calvo
marginally smaller than in the PPI data.
Table 6 reports, for the ￿rms￿sample, the distribution of ￿rms across the main CPI components
and the di⁄erent pricing rules, weighted according to the CPI weights. Like in the PPI case,
the most important group in terms of share of household consumption is the intermediate Calvo
agents, with 57% of household expenditure. All di⁄erent types of goods are represented in this
group, although the share of non energy industrial goods is particularly high and that of un-
processed food particularly low. Flexible Calvo pricing rules are very common among retailers
selling unprocessed food and, to a lesser extent, processed food. Indeed, to deal with the high
frequency of price changes many statistical institutes collect unprocessed food prices more than
once a month. Similarly, a signi￿cant fraction of sticky Calvo agents is found among retailers of
non energy industrial goods and services. Finally, annual Calvo price setters are also signi￿cantly
present in services and non energy industrial goods.
These expenditure weighted shares may be compared with ￿rm and spell shares. The weight in
terms of ￿rms and spells of intermediate and annual Calvo price setters is lower than in household
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Flexible Calvo 6.8% 4.4% 1.4% 0.8% 13.4%
Intermediate Calvo 5.7% 12.4% 22.0% 16.4% 56.6%
Sticky Calvo 0.2% 1.5% 7.2% 9.0% 17.9%
Annual Calvo 0.1% 0.5% 4.8% 6.8% 12.1%
Share of CPI 12.8% 18.8% 35.4% 33.0% 100.0%
Table 6. Price setting models by CPI main componentes (using CPI weights)
consumption. On the contrary, the share of ￿ exible Calvo agents is higher in terms of spells and
￿rms than in terms of total expenditure.
The bottom part of ￿gure 8 presents the contributions of the di⁄erent types of agents to the
hazard of the benchmark model. The downward slope of the hazard corresponds mostly to the
behaviour of these Calvo agents: the weight of intermediate Calvo price setters relative to sticky
Calvo price setters is decreasing and is negligible for large horizons. The existence of highly ￿ exible
retailers is explained by Calvo agents with very short durations. Finally, the models that consider
annual Calvo agents show that their share in the economy is relatively modest, although it is very
important in explaining the spikes at 12, 24, 36,... months.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we show that the common empirical ￿nding that hazard functions for price changes
are decreasing can be reconciled with standard models of price setting behaviour by allowing for
the existence of heterogeneous price setters. This idea is formalised by analysing the consequences
for the aggregate hazard rate of the coexistence of ￿rms with di⁄erent pricing rules. In particular,
we derive analytically the form of this heterogeneity e⁄ect for the most commonly used pricing
rules and ￿nd that the aggregate hazard is (nearly always) decreasing.
Results are illustrated using Spanish producer and consumer price data. A parsimonious approach
is taken, assuming that the aggregate economy is composed of several Calvo agents with di⁄erent
average price durations. Speci￿cally, we estimate a ￿nite mixture of Calvo models considering
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 groups and then choose the optimal model according to several model selection
criteria. We ￿nd that a very accurate representation of individual data is obtained by considering
just 4 groups of agents: one group of ￿ exible Calvo agents -with average price duration slightly
over 1 month-, one group of intermediate Calvo agents -with average price duration around 10
30
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 461
March 2005months- and one group of sticky Calvo agents -with average price duration over 3 years- plus an
annual Calvo process -with average price duration around a year and a half.
In terms of the relative size of the groups, the largest is the intermediate Calvo group, accounting
for around 50% of the production value in the case of the PPI and 57% of consumer￿ s expenditure
in the case of the CPI. The ￿ exible and sticky Calvo groups are roughly similar in size in terms
of the share of PPI (slightly above 20%). In the case of CPI, the share of ￿ exible Calvo agents
(13%) is lower than the share of the sticky Calvo group (18%). Finally, the annual Calvo group
is the smallest one, accounting for 7% of PPI and 12% of CPI. An analysis of the composition
of the groups in terms of the di⁄erent types of goods and services provides interesting results.
Speci￿cally, we observe that the ￿ exible pricing rule is used mostly by producers of energy and
intermediate goods and by retailers of food products; the intermediate rule is common among
all producers and retailers, although to a lesser extent among energy producers and retailers of
unprocessed food; and the sticky and annual Calvo pricing rules are mainly used by producers of
capital and consumer durable goods and by retailers of non-energy goods and services.
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The derivative of the weight on the hazard of the ￿rst group is equal to
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[1 ￿ ￿(k)] + H(k) (8)






That is, the derivative of the aggregate hazard is a convex linear combination of the
derivatives of the individual hazards plus a heterogeneity e⁄ect H(k), which is never positive.
This e⁄ect disappears if there is no heterogeneity (h1(k) = h2(k)) or if, for a given k, there are no
more ￿rms belonging to one group (￿(k) = 0) or ￿(k) = 1). This corresponds to the well known
fact in the duration analysis literature that uncontrolled heterogeneity biases estimated hazard
functions towards negative duration dependence.
A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the derivative to be negative is that the heterogeneity









[1 ￿ ￿(k)] ￿ jH(k)j (9)
B Appendix: Truncated Calvo agents
Alternatively, we could assume that the population of ￿rms is composed of two groups, each one
of them setting prices according to a di⁄erent truncated Calvo mechanism. In this case, there are
three possible scenarios: 1) both groups have di⁄erent Calvo parameters of the probability of not
changing prices before the truncation occurs, but equal period of truncation; 2) both groups have








& (￿1 6= ￿2) : The Calvo parameter ￿i is di⁄erent, but the truncation
point J is the same for both groups
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Population Hazard rate,
50% Truncated Calvo ave 12 months, J=36 m























50% Truncated Calvo ave 12 months, J=36 m





























i for k = 1;:::;J ￿ 1
￿
J￿1
i for k = J






i for k = 1;:::;J




(1 ￿ ￿i) for k = 1;:::;J ￿ 1
1 for k = J




￿(k)(1 ￿ ￿1) + [1 ￿ ￿(k)](1 ￿ ￿2) for k = 1;:::;J ￿ 1
1 for k = J





> > > > <
> > > > :
￿
￿(k)[1￿￿(k)]
1￿￿(k)￿k (￿1 ￿ ￿2)
2 ￿ 0 for k = 1;:::;J ￿ 1
1 ￿
￿(k)[1￿￿(k)]
1￿￿(k)￿k (￿1 ￿ ￿2)
2 > 0 for k = J
￿1 for k = J + 1
0 for k > J + 1
That is, in this case the aggregate hazard will be decreasing for all k, except for the last period






& (￿1 > ￿2) : The calvo parameter ￿i and the truncation point Ji are di⁄erent
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aggregate hazard: h(k) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
￿(k)(1 ￿ ￿1) + [1 ￿ ￿(k)](1 ￿ ￿2) for k = 1;:::;J2 ￿ 1
￿(k)(1 ￿ ￿1) + [1 ￿ ￿(k)] for k = J2
(1 ￿ ￿1) for k = J2 + 1;:::;J1 ￿ 1
1 for k = J1





> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
￿
￿(k)[1￿￿(k)]
1￿￿(k)￿k (￿1 ￿ ￿2)
2 < 0 for k = 1;:::;J2 ￿ 1
[1 ￿ ￿(k)]￿2 > 0 for k = J2
￿[1 ￿ ￿(k)]￿1 < 0 for k = J2 + 1
0 for J1 > k > J2 + 1
1 for k = J1
￿1 for k = J1 + 1
0 for k > J1 + 1
The aggregate hazard in this case is decreasing for the ￿rst (J2 ￿ 1) periods and constant for
the periods (J2 + 2 until J1 ￿ 1). In addition, the aggregate hazard will jump up in periods of






& (￿1 = ￿2 = ￿) :
aggregate hazard: h(k) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
(1 ￿ ￿) for k = 0;1;:::;J2 ￿ 1
￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿) = 1 ￿ ￿￿ for k = J2
(1 ￿ ￿) for k = J2 + 1;:::;J1 ￿ 1
1 for k = J1





> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
0 for k = 0;1;:::;J2 ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿￿ > 0 for k = J2
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿) = ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) < 0 for k = J2 + 1
0 for J1 > k > J2 + 1
1 > 0 for k = J1
￿1 < 0 for k = J1 + 1
0 for k > J1 + 1
In this case, the aggregate hazard will be constant everywhere, except for the truncation period
of each group, when it will jump up.
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